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the state return a valid indictment. Such analysis, however, is beyond
the scope of this comment.
A practical problem may also have been raised by the Farley
decision, in that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
now handed down an inflexible rule which leaves very little discretion
to the trial court in meeting individual situations. Such flexibility or
dscretion is problably desirable because an unreasonable or capricious delay by the state has been held to be a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.28
In summary it is submitted that the law in West Virginia, as
enunciated in Farley, is that if the defendant in a criminal proceeding
challenges the indictment brought against him, and that indictment
is declared void as a result, the defendant will not be allowed to
invoke the three term rule for that term or for those terms during
which he was awaiting re-indictment. But there are some unanswered
constitutional questions, as well as the open issue of whether the
trial court can discharge the defendant under the three term statute
where the prosecutor has acted in bad faith in bringing an indictment
which he knows will be voided.
Stephen P. Swisher

Statutes-Relation of an Enactment
to Its Title
J. Howard Myers, the petitioner, was charged by the grand
jury of the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County in six felony
indictments for conspiracy with others to affect the market, price and
supply of commodities and printing purchased and being purchased
by the State of West Virginia under the provisions of West Virginia
Code chapter 5A, article 3. Petitioner instituted a proceeding in
prohibition in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seeking
to restrain respondents, George W. Wood, Judge of the Inter28

Justice Harlan would have decided the entire Klopfer case on the

basis of a denial of the process in the context of being a denial of fundamental
fairness. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1969). An unreasonable delay has been held to be fundamentally unfair. Greathouse v. State,
249 A.2d 207 (Md. 1969). Isn't this the very essence of the provision in the
W. VA. CONST. art. nI, § 14, .y3hich provides that trial shall be without
unreasonable delay?
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mediate Court of Kanawha County, and Patrick Casey, Prosecuting
Attorney of Kanawha County, from trying petitioner on the six indictments.
Petitioner asserted that respondents had no jurisdiction to try
him under the six indictments because West Virginia Code chapter
5A, article 3, section 38,' the basis of the indictments, was void,
unenforceable and unconstitutional. Petitioner contended: (1) the
statute in question violated article VI, section 30 of the West Virginia
Constitution because the title did not indicate that the act contained
criminal provisions; (2) the statute violated the due process clauses
of both the United States and West Virginia Constitutions because
it did not clearly and fully inform the accused of the criminal offense;
(3) the statute violated the due process clauses of both constitutions
because it failed to distinguish between criminal and innocent conduct; and (4) chapter 5A, article 3 of the Code violated the due
process clauses of both constitutions because section 362 provided the
penalty for violation of all sections of article 3 except section 353
to be a misdemeanor, and yet section 38 specifically provided for a
felony penalty, making this article too confusing and indefinite. Held:
writ of prohibition awarded. State ex rel. Myers v. Wood. 175 S.E.2d
637 (W. Va. 1970).
Speaking for the majority, Judge Berry rejected the issues
raised by petitioner regarding whether West Virginia Code chapter
5A, article 3, section 38 was void for vagueness 4 because it was to
'W. VA. CODE ch. 5A, art. 3, § 38 (Michie 1966):
It shall be unlawful for any person to jointly combine or collude or
conspire in any way to affect the market, or price, or supply of
commodities and printing obtained or to be obtained by the State
under the provisions of this article, and upon violation thereof such
person shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction therefor,
shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more
than five years, and be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.
2W. VA. CODE ch. 5A, art. 3, § 36 (Michie 1966):
A person who violates a provision of this article other than the provision of section thirty-five [5A-3-§ 35] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, upon conviction, shall be confined in jail not less than ten days
nor more than one year, or fined not less than ten nor more than
five hundred dollars, or both, in the descretion of the court.
3 Chapter 5A, article 3, section 35 of the Code provides that any commissioner who has a financial interest in the purchasing of commodities by the
state or receives rewards from persons awarded contracts shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and sentenced to three months to one year or a fine of fifty to
one thousand dollars or both.
4Although there is no perfect standard to determine whether a statute
is so vague that it violates the due process clauses of the Federal and State
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indefinite,' failed to adequately inform him that his conduct was
criminal,6 and whether chapter 5A, article 3 was too confusing as
to which sections were criminal provisions."
The material issue in Myers was whether a general and comprehensive law enacted for the purpose of combining the state's regulation of administrative and financial affairs into one act, could constitutionally include relevant criminal provisions without specifically
mentioning them in the title of the act. In other words, did chapter
5A, article 3, section 38 of the Code violate article VI, section 30
Constitutions, Judge Berry concluded that "[t]he basic requirements are that
such a statute must be couched in such language so as to notify a potential
offender of a criminal provision as to what he should avoid doing in order to
not be guilty of the offense." The court referred to 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 76
(1948).
1 Judge Berry noted that:
All that is necessary to create a valid statutory offense is for the
statute to define or specify the acts necessary to constitute the offense in order to enable a person to know when he performs an act
whether it is forbidden by the statute, and a valid statute may be
couched in general language.
Id. at 641.
In State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 43 S.E.2d 214 (1947), defendant,
the mayor of Weston, was indicted for wilfully secreting public records in
violation of the W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 5, § 22 (Michie 1966). Defendant
demurred to the indictment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court stated that a statute is valid if it specifies and defines
with sufficient certainty acts which constitute a violation of the act. The court
reasoned that a statute, general in its terms, is consitutional if the princple
words are comprehensive in meaning.
I Chapter 5A, article 3, section 38 of the Code "is not too vague to fully
inform and plainly inform or notify a person that he will be guilty of violating the provisions of the statute if he is a party to or combines with anyone to
affect or 'rig' the price of any commodities obtained by the state

....

"

State

ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 637, 641 (W. Va. 1970).
7 Although § 36 describes violations of all the provisions in article 3 as
misdemeanors except § 35, the court held that § 38, which specifically provides for a felony penalty, does not violate due process of law. Where an act
provides that violations of its provisions, with certain exceptions, are punishable as misdemeanors, and a certain section of that act, though not excepted,
provides for a felony penalty, the court has held that the specific rather than
the general provision should be controlling. In State v. Runnion, 122 W. Va.
134, 7 S.E.2d 648 (1940), the court disregarded general provisions dealing
with penalties of crimes in the act as misdemeanors in favor of a specific
section which provided felony penalties for forgery.
8 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30:
No act hereafter passed, shall embrace more than one object, and
that shall be expressed in the title. But if any object shall be embraced in an act which is not so expressed, the act shall be void only
as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed, and no law shall
be revived or amended, by reference to its title only; but the law
revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at large, in the new
act ....
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of the West Virginia Constitution8 because the title9 to the act failed
to embrace the object of the criminal penalties?
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has established
as the standard of sufficiency of the title to a statute whether the
title induces a person interested in the subject matter of the act to
read the act itself."0 It is important that neither members of the legislature nor the public be misled or surprised as to the contents of any
matter of legislation." The title to an act may be phrased in general terms, 2 but it should not be so general that the real aim or
purpose of the act is concealed. 3 If the title is couched in general
terms yet provides a fair and reasonable index to the object of the
act, it is not necessary to enumerate all the specifications of the
9
Acts of the Legislature, Red. Sess., ch. 132 (1961), which embodied
chapter 5A of the Code, provided in the act's title that its purpose was:
mo repeal article five and eight, chapter five; section ten, article
nine, chapter six; section ten-a, article one, chapter twenty-five; chapter twenty-five-a; and articles eight and eleven, chapter twenty-nine
of the code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one,
as amended; and to amend said code by adding thereto a new
chapter, designated chapter 5a, all relating to the administration and
financial affairs of the state and to the department of finance and
administration, its powers and duties. (emphasis added).
10 State v. Simms, 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958); State v. Rector,
130 W. Va. 316, 43 S.E.2d 235 (1947).
11McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 reh.
denied 46 S.E. 499 (1903).
The framers of the West Virginia Constitution were wary of the dangers
inherent in the State Legislature's authority to enact laws. In 1862 at the West
Virginia Constitutional Convention held in Wheeling, Virginia, the delegates
debated over the necessity and utility of including article VI, § 30 in the
Constitution. James H. Brown of Kanawha County, proponent of the provision, told the Convention the story of a bridge over the Gauley River burning down and then related how the Virginia Legislature, in legislating a
replacement, attached to the building authorization, entitled "Gauley Bridge",
a number of provisions dealing with delinquent land taxes. 1 DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF WEST VIRGINIA
908. Many state courts, including the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Moats v. Cook, 131 W. Va. 151, 167 S.E. 137 (1932), have accepted
Cooley's statement of the purposes of article VI sectoin 30 and similar provisions in other state constitutions to be:
[F]irst, to prevent hodge podge or "log-rolling" legislation; second,
to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in the bills of which the title gave no intimation, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and third, to fairly appraise the people, through such publication of legsilative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects
of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they
should so desire . . . . (emphasis added).
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927).
12 Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 150 S.E. 738 (1929).
13 McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508, reh.
denied 46 S.E. 499 (1903).
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act.'" However, when the title is so general that it conceals the real
aim or purpose of the act, the act is void." The court as early as
1874 established the method of determining whether a title sufficiently embraces the object of the act.1" "The question whether the
object of an act is expressed in the title, is determind by a comparison of the act and the title, and is not influenced by any former law
'
which the latter act, if valid, expressly or by implication, repeals." 17
Respondents in Myers erroneously contended that the act in
question, when examined in light of the repeal acts, met the requirements of article VI, section 30 (embracing the object of an act in
the title), since the title to the repealed acts met those constitutional
requirements.'" When the Legislature amends the code and re-enacts
a former act, the title to the former act cures any insufficiencies in
the title to the amending act. If the object of the former act was
embraced in the title, thereby satisfying the constitutional requirements, the amending legislation does not spoil the validity of the
enactment, providing the object of the new act is essentially the
same.' 9 However, when the Legislature enacts a new law which
repeals and does not amend or re-enact a former law, the former
act is annulled and its title may not be relied upon to supply the
essential constitutional requirements to the title of the new act."
If the new act repeals the original act, the title must be tested on its
own merits against the requirements that the object of the act be expressed in its title. In Myers, there was little doubt or uncertainty
which former acts the Legislature intended to repeal." When the
Legislature has drafted faulty legislation, the court, as in Myers, will
not exonerate the Legislature by permitting a reference to former
acts in order to meet basic constitutional requirements.
The majority in Myers looked to the title of the act in question
to ascertain the relationship or "reference" between the crime of
v. Thompson, 80 W. Va. 698, 93 S.E. 810 (1917).
'-Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W. Va. 559, 44 S.E. 223 (1903).
1 Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74 (1874). Note however, the rule of
law in syllabus point 1 in Shields was overruled by Simms v. Sawyers, 85 W.
Va. 245, 101 S.E. 467 (1919), which held that W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30
is mandatory and not merely directory upon the Legislature.
17Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74, 86 (1874).
18 State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 637, 644 (W. Va. 1970);
see State v. Furr, 101 W. Va. 178, 132 S.E. 504 (1926); Roby v. Sheppard,
42 W. Va. 286, 26 S.E. 278 (1896).
19Price v. Moundsville 43 W. Va. 523, 27 S.E. 218 (1897).
20
Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74 (1874).
21 See State v. Morton, 140 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E.2d 791
(1954), where
it was argued that a certain statute was by implication repealed by a later
enactment.
14State
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price "rigging" and the over-all object of regulating the state's purchasing authority. The object of an act, which must be embraced in
the act's title, is its general aim or purpose of enactment.22 The
object in relation to article VI, section 30 of the West Virginia Constitution is the "matter or thing forming the groundwork of the
act." 23 Only one object may be embraced in an act and expressed
in its title; but suppose the title expresses only one object, and the
act itself includes other objects? The court in Myers placed great
weight on State v. Haskins,2" which held that an act may still be valid
if all the objects are incidental or auxiliary and are "germane" to the
main object of the act. Since Haskins the primary standard used in
determining the validity of an act with regard to the requirements of
article VI, section 30 has been the "germaneness" of the objects in
the act to the object embraced in the title.25
The West Virginia Legislature expressed as the object in the
title to chapter 5A of the Code: "to repeal . . . and to amend...
chapter... relating to the administration and financial affairs of the
state .... ."2 " The majority in Myers, to determine whether section 38

of article 3, chapter 5A was germane to the object embraced in the
title, relied upon State v. Nickelson,2" a factually similar case recently decided in Iowa. Iowa has a provision in its constitution 8
comparable to article VI, section 30 of the West Virginia Constitution. Recently the Iowa Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which included certain criminal provisions. The title to
the act adopting the Uniform Commercal Code stated that the sub22 Casto v. Upshur County High School Board, 94 W. Va. 513, 119 S.E.
470 (1923).
23 Moats v. Cook, 113 W. Va. 151, 153, 167 S.E. 137, 138 (1932).
24
In State v. Haskins, 92 W. Va. 632, 115 S.E. 720 (1923), the defendant was convicted of stealing automobile tires under Ch. 112, § 92, Acts of
the Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1921). The title of this act described its object
as creating a complete and comprehensive law governing the construction,
reconstruction, maintenance and repairs of public roads and the regulation of
traffic thereon; the title did not mention any penal offenses for auto theft.
The court held that the act was unconstitutional because it violated article
VI, section 30 of the constitution. The specific section (i.e., § 92), providing
felony penalties for the stealing of automobiles, or any part thereof, was held
to be neither auxiliary nor germane to the object embraced in the act's title.
The court indicated that most acts of the Legislature should be liberally construed in light of article VI, section 30, but that sections providing for felony
crimes should be strictly construed in favor of the accused.
25 Prager v. Chapman & Sons Co., 122 W. Va. 428, 9 S.E.2d 880 (1940);
Elliott v. Hudson, 117 W. Va. 345, 185 S.E. 465 (1936); Bedford Corp. v.
Price,26112 W. Va. 674, 166 S.E. 380 (1932).
Ch. 132, Acts of the Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1961). See note 9 supra.
27 169 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1969).
28
IowA CONST. art. III, § 29.
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ject of the act included all matters relating to commercial transactions
but did not mention the code's criminal offenses. 9 The Supreme
Court of Iowa held that the section dealing with a felony penalty
for a mortgagor disposing of the mortgaged property without the
mortgagee's consent was unconstitutional because its subject was
not embraced in the title and not related to the subject embraced.
Judge Calhoun, dissenting in Myers, believed that chapter 5A
should be considered as a whole and liberally construed to meet the
constitutional requirements of being properly titled; that in the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands that the act
is constitutional."0 Judge Hoffman in the early case of Shields v.
Bennett' stated that the court should construe the language used
in a title and the meaning it conveys in the most "comprehensive"
manner. Since that time, it has been the policy of the court to apply
to the titles of acts the most liberal interpretation favorable to the
validity of the act. 2 On the basis of this authority, Judge Calhoun
believed that it was the court's "clear legal duty" to give an act
"every reasonable construction" to uphold it as constitutional. In
support of his dissenting opinion, Judge Calhoun stated the general
rule in construing statutes and their titles33 and supported this general
rule with several West Virginia cases on point. In Judge Calhoun's
opinion the crime of rigging prices was germane and rationally connected with the general object stated in the title, i.e., the "administration and financial affairs of the state .

. ." In holding to the

contrary, the majority, Judge Calhoun asserted, had violated the
"rule of reason" which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
29 Acts 61st Iowa Gen. Assem. 38 ch. 413:
AN ACT to be known as the Uniform Commercial Code, relating
to certain commercial transactions in or regarding personal property
and contracts and other documents concerning them, including sales,
commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit,
bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, other documents
of title, investment securities, and secured transactions, including
certain sales of accounts, chattel paper, and contract rights; providing for public notice to third parties in certain circumstances; regulating procedure, evidence and damages in certain court actions
involving such transactions, contracts or documents; to make uniform
the law with respect thereto; and repealing inconsistent legislation.
30 State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 637, 646 (W. Va. 1970); see
Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Patton, 9 W. Va. 648 (1876); Slack v. Jacob, 8
W. Va. 612 (1875).
31 8 W. Va. 74 (1874).
32 Bedford Corp. v. Price, 112 W. Va. 674, 166 S.E. 380 (1932); State
v. Scarbrough, 108 W. Va. 9, 150 S.E. 219 (1929); and State v. Furr, 101
W. Va. 178, 132 S.E. 504 (1926).
33 State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 637, 646 (W. Va. 1970).
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and other state courts have faithfully applied in reviewing acts of
the Legislature.34
It should be noted, however, that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has generally held that criminal provisions should
be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the accused."
The only exceptions to this general rule are acts pertaining to the
control of alcoholic beverages in which the object of such acts is the
control of liquor.36 Under these exceptions the word "control" is
broadly interpreted to include regulation, restraint, domination and
protection of intoxicating liquors3 7 Other than this exception criminal provisions are strictly construed with regard to article VI, section 30. The distinction then between the majority and Judge Calhoun is the standard of interpretation to be utilized in construing the
act. Judge Calhoun applied a liberal standard and concluded that
the entire act, including all its sections with different objects, was
constitutional. On the other hand, the majority believed the root of
the controversy to be the inclusion of a criminal penalty in section
38 without expressing it in the object embraced in the title to chapter 5A. The majority thus strictly interpreted the penal section in
light of the object of the entire act. The controlling factor in Myers
was that the West Virginia State Legislature provided for the repeal
of certain specified acts and replaced them with a general act con34 Judge Calhoun cited in the dissent State v. Haskins, 92 W. Va. 632,
115 S.E. 720 (1923), which was also used to support the majority's opinion.
Although the court in Haskins noted that most statutes should be liberally
construed by the court, it also noted that criminal statutes should be strictly
construed.
35 Besides Haskins, there is a series of other cases which have stood for
the proposition that penal statutes ought to be strictly construed. For example,
in State v. Mason, 141 W. Va. 217, 89 S.E.2d 425 (1955), the court indicated
that the difference between strict and liberal construction of statutes is whether
the court will use extrinsic evidence to construe the statute beyond the express
meaning of the language used. A "house of ill fame" in relation to a law
prohibiting prostitution should be subject to strict definition, said the court in
State v. Pyle, 86 W. Va. 636, 104 S.E. 100 (1920), and held that a house
solely occupied by only the defendant who engaged in illegal sexual intercourse was not a house of ill fame. In Diddle v. Continental Casualty Co.,
65 W. Va. 170, 63 S.E. 962 (1909), Judge Poffenbarger, speaking for the
majority, held that a statute which made jumping on or off a train a misdemeanor and excepted passengers and employees of the railroad company
from its provisions should be strictly construed to apply only to trespassers.
Also in Hall v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 44 W. Va. 36, 28 S.E. 754 (1897), the
court held that a statute that imposes a penalty for overcharges of freight or
passenger rates should be "subject to rigid construction". See also Dials v.
Blain, 144 W. Va. 765, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); Reeves v. Ross, 62 W. Va. 7,
57 S.E.
36 284 (1907); State v. Beasley, 21 W. Va. 777 (1883).
State v. Jaranko, 142 W. Va. 1, 93 S.E.2d 537 (1956); Boyles v. County
Court37of Barbour County, 116 W. Va. 689, 182 S.E. 868 (1935).
Boyles v. County Court of Barbour County, 116 W. Va. 689, 182 S.E.
868 (1935).
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solidated into a comprehensive package containing all matters relating to the administration and financial affairs of the state. At the
same time, without explicit mention in the act's title, the Legislature
established a crime of rigging of the market, price and supply of
goods being bought by the state. Had the Legislature amended and
re-enacted the former acts, the titles to those acts might have been
used to cure any insufficiencies in the title to the new act. While Judge
Calhoun believed that price rigging was germane to the regulation
of the state's purchasing practices, the majority after rigorous reconstruction was unable to reach that conclusion. Consequently the
court in Myers held:
It therefore appears, under the provisions of section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution of this state . . ., that by
virtue of the fact no mention of any kind is made in the
title to the act, which contains the section involved herein,
with regard to any crime or penalty contained in the Act,
section 38 of the Act under which the indictments are
drawn in the instant case is unconstitutional."8
Subsequent to Myers, in Huntington v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co.,39 a case involving the constitutionality of a tax law in reference
to article VI, section 30, Judge Calhoun delivered the majority opinion which was substantially the same as his dissent in Myers.
General and comprehensive regulations, and proper administration of the state's purchasing procedures are basic and essential
to efficient management of government. It is always a scandalous
event for private citizens to discover that their public servants and
elected officials have been corrupt and dishonest. It was a relatively
minor affair when the Iowa court held that the penalties provided
in the Uniform Commercial Code were unconstitutional, but highly
controversial in West Virginia when the court held that the statutory
provision against price rigging of commodities bought by the state
was unconstitutional. Petitioner Myers will never be brought to
trial to face an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. To its credit
the Legislature, in a special session, moved quickly to correct the
situation by amending the unconstitutional sections of chapter 5A
of the Code.4"
William Charles Garrett
State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.2d 637, 644 (W. Va. 1970).
Huntington v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 177 S.E.2d 591 (W.
Va. 1970). A statute prohibiting municipalities from levying a tax on public
utilities does not violate article VI, section 30 if the title to the statute is so
general that it would include any tax on businesses taxed under W. VA. CODE
ch. 11,
4 0 art. 12A, § 3 (Michie 1970).
38

39

Ch. 2, Acts of the Legislature, Second Ext. Sess. (1970).
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